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The USSR is a whole world in itself, with an unexampled richness of geography, 
culture, language and people. This shows itself in the demography, especially in respect of 
fertility. The range there is wide, though there are other instances with equal range--in 
Canada in the 1930s from bare replacement in English-speaking Ontario to an average of 8 
children ever born in French-speaking Quebec. 
Such ranges are of course transitional; what they mean is that a process inevitable for 
all has come earlier to one group than to another. The process has gone to its natural 
culmination in Canada; in the USSR it is still proceeding. 
This working paper recognizes the 17 largest nationalities, that divide in a seemingly 
bimodal fashion into two groups, one with a mean number of births ranging from 1.8 to 2.6, 
the other mostly around 6. 
The method used is in principle the best, being based on a partial life history of 
individual women, with full details of their childbearing experience. The data was gathered 
in a 1985 survey, in which women were asked to recollect back to 1970-75. It does not 
entirely escape from the difficulty with any retrospective survey relying on the respondent's 
memory in that the quality of reporting differs systematically between the more sophisticated 
populations, that have lower birth rates and the less sophisticated, whose birth rates are in 
the high loop of the bimodal distribution. When errors are uncorrelated with the subject of 
survey they do little harm, but that is unlikely to be true on birth recollections. 
Nonetheless these are positively the best data to be had for now, and they should be 
greeted warmly by students of the Soviet society. For through their bearing on demographic 





Using data from a socio-demographic survey conducted in 1985 in the USSR, fertility 
parity-progression tables were constructed for the 17 most populated Soviet nationalities. 
These tables give the probability of a woman who gave birth to a child between 1970 and 
1974 to have her next child by the time of the survey. Using World Fertility Survey data, 
the model of natural fertility by parity was built and two subgroups of women were 
identified: those who control family size and those who do not. Nationalities differ 
considerably by the proportion of women who control childbearing (from 17% for the Tajiks 
to 99% for the Jews), and by TFR for those who control family size (from 4.2 for the Tajiks 
to 1.5 for the Jews). 
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PARITY-PROGRESSION FERTILITY TABLES 
FOR THE NATIONALITIES OF THE USSR 
Leonid ~arsky' and Sergei ~cherbo9 
INTRODUCTION 
When a married female recognizes her right and responsibility to define the number 
of children in her family and the time of their births, and at the same time tries to fulfil these 
intentions in practice, the number of children already born becomes the dominant factor when 
analyzing fertility processes. Many demographic factors are taken into account when a 
woman decides to bear another child. The age of the marital partners may become a limiting 
factor. Both husband and wife may think that it is too late to have another child, because at 
the time of their retirement that child could still be dependent on them. This argument is 
now very important in the USSR, because it is common to provide support (also financial) 
until the child finishes his education and even later, especially in the families of white-collar 
workers and intellectuals. 
Another factor taken into account is the age of the youngest child. This is important 
both from an educational point of view, and from the possibility of women not working 
outside of the home. In the USSR, one receives benefits from the government for two 
children. When planning the family, a woman considers the optimal age interval of her 
children. And certainly simply having a small child in the family gives unmeasurable 
psychological satisfaction to its parents. 
But in the end, the major influencing factor on a woman deciding to have another 
child is the number of children already born.3 This priority is also mentioned by W. Lutz 
in the introduction to his study based on World Fertility Survey (WFS) data, where he 
analyzed fertility by parity for 41 developing and 14 developed countries (Lutz 1989). 
Unfortunately he did not have data for the Soviet Union so this large and very heterogeneous 
country was absent from the study. But we hope that by analyzing the data available, we can 
partly fill the gap and perform a separate interest. 
In the Soviet Union the analysis of fertility by parity is very important. The majority 
of the subgroups in the population have already made the transition towards a modem type 
of reproduction behavior (controlled fertility); the other groups are gradually moving towards 
this goal. Especially distinct differences could be found between the different nationalities 
'Labontoy for the Studia of Rcproductian of Population, lnrtitutc of Strrtirticr of the USSR State Committee 
of Statbtica (GOSCOMSTAT), Morcow, USSR. 
% p u ~ o n  b g r r u n ,  lntcrnational lnrtitutc for Applied Syrtam h l y r i s ,  A-2361 h e n b u r g ,  Auatria. 
3 0 ~  in demographic rnnlyrir in order to find a solution within the framework of a relatively rirnple rcheme and 
under thc ptculiuitica of available information, the notion "number of children that a woman has' ir rubrtitutcd by 'the 
number of children ever born". Under relatively low levels of infant mortality, ruch a rubrtitution would not lead to 
rubstantial inaccuracy in thc conclusions. 
located at various stages of demographic transition. Nationality has now become the most 
important indication of differential fertility. 
METHOD AND DATA 
In the socio-demographic survey of 1985 which covered 5% of the total population, 
among others were the questions about reproduction biography. Women were asked about 
the year of their marriage, total number of children, and birthdate of each child (month and 
year). From this survey we could determine the distribution of married women by parity and 
the intervals h e e n  births. Our study was based on the information about one cohort of 
married women that gave birth to children h e e n  1970-1974. For each b e d  woman 
who bore a child of a given parity in 1970-1974 and remained married by the time of the 
survey (1 January 1985), we obtained information about the date of the next births. Data for 
the whole of the USSR are given in Table 1. The same data were available for most of the 
nationalities with populations exceeding 1 million (Appendix A). 








In most cases the number of observations for parities higher than 6 were insufficient 
for comprehensive study, and thus the indicators for these parities were not estimated. But 
the data for the first 6 parities were certainly reliable for all selected nationalities with high 
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fertility (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azerbaijanis, Kirghiz, Taj iks, Armenians, Turkmen). For the 
nationalities with low fertility, the indicators for parities 5 and 6 were unstable and the 
number of observations insufficient. Thus a summary group of nationalities with low 
fertility was created, where the stability of indicators for parities 5 and 6 was definite and 
the information on parity progression ratios of parities 5 and 6 from this group was used for 
building fertility tables for each nationality with low fertility (Russians, Ukminians, 
Byelorussians, Georgians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, Latvians, Estonians, Tatars and Jews). 
Using data from the combined group of parities 5 and 6 did not influence the final results for 
the individual nationality, because the number of births of these parities was very small 
(relatively) for women of reported nationalities and fertility indicators for these parities were 
similar. At the next stage the parity-progression ratios for parities 5 and 6 for each table 
were smoothed. 
For parities 7 and higher we rejected the idea of estimating the parity-progression 
ratios for each nationality or combined group. We assumed the hypothesis that a female who 
has seven and more births does not at all restrict the number of children and does not use any 
means of contraception. We assumed that the probability of births of parities 7 and higher 
does not depend on parity-specific fertility regulation, which means that the intention of 
women to have another child is independent of her previous childbearing history. We had no 
evidence to consider differences in natural fertility of different nationalities. After the 
increase of fertility in the 1950s and 1960s the nationalities of Middle Asia achieved a very 
high level of reproduction. This was partly due to an improved health status of females. In 
the 1970s and 1980s there was a relatively high mortality level in the USSR, and there 
existed a differentiation of mortality level by nationality. But this phenomena least affected 
the female population in the reproductive ages. Thus we assumed that the fertility level of 
those groups of the USSR population who do not control family size corresponds or is at 
least very close to some standard that is inherent in populations with a very high fertility 
level. 
Taking this into consideration we created the standard of natural fertility in the 
following way. From the large number of cohorts who finished their reproduction behavior 
and were studied in the framework of the WFS, we took only those whose Total Fertility 
Rate (TFR) exceeded 7.5. We averaged the data and built one single distribution of married 
females according to the number of children ever born. The cumulate of this distribution was 
approximated by the Gomperz-Makeham curve. This curve was taken as a standard of 
uncontrolled fertility. This standard does not pretend to reflect the maximum fertility level 
and some populations could easily have higher fertility. But in the framework of our study, 
the chosen level of natural fertility is quite suitable. 
Using this curve we built a basic fertility table (Table 2). The relations between the 
indicators in the table are very simple: 
Since L. Henry (1953) suggested this method for measuring fertility, the technic of building 
fertility tables by parity was well elaborated (Lutz 1989). 
Table 2 Parity-progression table, taken as a standard of natural fertility. 




Taking into account our hypothesis that births of parities 7 and higher correspond to 
natural fertility, we accepted for all nationalities indicators from the standard starting from 
parity 7. We built a parity-progression table for the total population, 17 selected nationalities 
and two groups of nationalities - with high and low fertility (see Appendix Table B). Strictly 
s w g ,  tables that were constructed in the way described above are not cohort tables, 
because their indicators are not related to a particular marital cohort. These tables were 
generated using data related to different cohorts who bore children of different parities but 
at the same time (1970-74). But again, strictly speaking, that was not a synthetic cohort 
because in respect to each parity, only specific cohorts were observed in time. We believe 
that this approach is the most fruitful, because the analyzed process is not as distant in time 
from the beginning of observation, as in pure cohort analysis. At the same time some 
fictitiousness of a synthetic cohort is reduced to a minimum. 
Using such an approach, it was possible to subdivide the table population into two 
subpopulations: those who control family size and those who follow the pattern of natural 
fertility. If we consider that all those who bore the 7th child come from a subpopulation that 
does not restrict family size, and all those who control the family size already realized their 
procreative intentions, then the share of population that controls fertility could be estimated 
by dividing the number of those who gave birth to 7 or more children l7 by the related value 
in the standard population: l7 -=635. 
For example, if in a parity-progression table 353 Kazakh women out of 1000 gave 
birth to 7 and more children, then we can assume that 556 women out of 1000 never 
controlled their fertility and all indicators for this group correspond to the standard; but 444 
did control family size and their indicators are absolutely different; the total indicators for 
Kazakhs are weighted characteristics of the two subgroups. 
Such calculations were performed for all nationalities and similar fertility tables were 
produced (see Appendix B). Figure 1 gives a graphic representation of an l, column for 
several of the selected nationalities. 
Share of women reaching parity 
Share 
0  1 2  3 4  5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4  
Parity 
- Standard + Russians -+-- Uzbeks 
- Armenians - J e w s  . - Azerbaijanis 
L I 
Figure 1 5 
Of course it is not necessary to interpret all births from those who control family size 
as planned and desired. The culture of birth regulation in most of the groups is low, but 
moral availability and social acceptability of abortions in most of the groups approaches the 
situation where undesirable children are not born. 
RESULTS 
Figure 2 gives the estimates of the proportion of women who control family size for 
all selected nationalities. The nationalities are ordered by the total fertility rate F, in 
descending order. As expected, the smallest share of women who control family size was 
obtained for the Tajiks (16.7 %), slightly higher for the Kirghiz (25.7 %) and the Turkmen 
(27.3 %). The Kazakhs and Azerbaijanis are in the middle - 44.4 % and 71.9 % respectively. 
All other nationalities almost completely switched to a controlled type of reproduction, and 
the proportion of those who do not control family size is negligible from 3.6% for 
Moldavians to 0.2 % for the Jews. 






















All of those who do not restrict the number of births have the same fertility level 
(according to our standard) with the mean number of children born by them at 7.5. But 
among those who control family size, the average number of children differs. In Table 3 we 
tried to present two indicators: the proportion of women who restricted the number of births 
and their TFR. Comparison of these indicators for different population groups demonstrates 
that they play a different role in the development of the fertility level. 
The low fertility group consists of nationalities whose reproduction in most cases falls 
below replacement level. Among these, usually not more than 1% of the females follow the 
pattern of natural fertility, and they do not play an important role in the generation of total 
fertility level for these nationalities. Therefore the average number of children born in the 
whole group does not differ much from those who control family size. (This is not true only 
for Moldavians). In the group of nationalities with high fertility, that is true only for 
Armenians, who traditionally were included into this group of high fertility. Together with 
the Moldavians in the 1970s-1980s, they occupied the intermediate position according to 
fertility level. But according to our estimate of the proportion of females who control family 
size, they have already moved to another group. Others nationalities are in a transition 
towards low fertility level. 
It is also possible to distinguish between children born by those who control and those 
who do not control family size. An example of this distinction is given in Figure 3 for the 
groups with the most typical fertility behavior. 
The results presented allow us to conclude that acceptance of the twochild family 
model delays from the practice of family size control. The distribution of females who 
restrict the number of births in this group of nationalities does not have a distinct 
mathematical mode. The number of children with which they stop the childbearing process 
is distributed more or less uniformly between three and five. At the same time for 
nationalities with low fertility, the mode for two children is explicit. Among Russians, 
Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Estonians, more than half of the females stop childbearing 
after having two children. Among these nationalities and also among Latvians, Lithuanians 
and Jews more than 70% of the marital couples stopped childbearing after having one or two 
children. The one-child family is in second place after the twochild family among these 
nationalities. For Georgians, Armenians, Moldavians and Tatars the mathematical mode is 
for two children. But in second position are the families with three children. Only among the 
Jews is the onechild family as popular as the family with two children. 
The popularity of families with two children among nationalities with low fertility 
may also be confirmed by the data on the average number of children that a woman who 
gave birth to two children will bear in the future F,. For low fertility nationalities this 
number is less than 0.5 (only for Moldavians about 0.8). Among the nationalities with high 
fertility but for subgroups who control family size, this indicator is higher than 1.5 except 
Armenians for whom it is only 0.8. 
Table 3 Share of women who limit family size and average number of children born to 
women of different nationalities. 
Tajiks Kazakhs 
1 7 8 0  
Order of blrth. 
I No blrCh control. l l r t h  control 
0 C n r h d  blrlha. 
Azerbaijanis 
Shue. 
1 2  3 4  0 1 7  8 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4  
Order of blrth. 
I No blrth control. l l r l k  conlrol. 
0 m r c e d  blrtkr. 
Shue. 
1  2 9  4  0 1 7  8  0  10 11 1 2 1 9  14 
Order of blrth. 
I No blrth control. DIrth control 
0 m r t e d  blrtkr. 
Russians 
Shue. 
Order of blrth. 
I No blrth control. l l r t h  control 
0 Awrled blrth.. 
Figure 3 Share of children of each order 
born by different groups of women 
The diversity of the demographic situation in the USSR from a fertility point of view 
is amazing. If we compare the fertility level of the cohorts under consideration with the 
corresponding data from the WFS study, one can see that according to TFR, Tajiks are at 
the same level as Bangladesh, Columbia, Costa-Rica (6.9). Higher TFR was obtained only 
for Syria, Jordan, Mexico and Morocco. At the same time the level of TFR for Russians 
(1.8) was below almost all given cohort data except for the Netherlands. 
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Parity-progression tables for different nationalities of the USSR. 
total - relates to the indicators in the parity-progression table for the whole nationality 
without subdivision of those who control and those who do not control family size. 
limit - relates to the indicators in the parity-progression table for those women of given 
nationality who control family size. 
no limit - relates to the indicators in the parity-progression table for those women of given 












8 78 1 
9 714 
10 66 1 








1 69 1 
2 193 
3 219 
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8 78 1 
9 714 
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I(n) W(n) W(n) 
m limit total limit 
54 48 46 
53 247 245 
51 459 457 
49 129 1 26 
47 42 39 
44 28 24 


























I(n) I(n) W(n) W(n) W(n) 
total limit mlimit total limit no limit 
loo0 996 4 51 51 0 
949 945 4 293 293 0 
656 652 3 529 529 0 
127 123 3 99 99 0 
28 25 3 19 19 0 
9 6 3 5 5 0 
4 1 3 1 1 0 
2 2 0 0 
2 2 0 0 
2 2 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
1 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 



























I(n) W(n) W(n) 
no limit total Limit 
6 50 50 
6 243 243 
6 537 537 
5 127 127 
5 28 28 
5 8 8 













































































B y e l o ~ v i u v  
a(n) 









8 78 1 
9 7 14 
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I i l h u A n i . ~  
a(a) 
Parity total 







7 83 7 






























































limit no limit total 
988 I2 47 
942 11 145 
797 11 4 n  
321 11 248 
74 10 % 
19 9 16 
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limit no limit 
4 21 
1 1  20 
39 26 
6 1 36 















1 .O 0.8 
0.9 0.6 




















































5 84 1 
6 839 
7 837 
8 78 1 
9 714 






























5 83 1 
6 834 
7 837 





































































229 66 1 
153 626 
81 585 
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3.7 0.7 
3.3 0.3 



































5 41 8 
6 627 
7 837 
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I(n) I(n) W(n) W(n) 
tocrl limit no limit tocrl limit 
loo0 993 7 58 58 
942 935 7 234 233 
708 70 1 7 5 13 513 
1 % 189 7 144 1 43 
52 46 6 34 34 
18 12 6 10 10 
7 2 5 3 2 
5 5 1 
4 4 1 
3 3 1 
2 2 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 0 
0 0 0 





























































































































































5 41 8 
6 627 
7 837 
8 78 1 
9 714 
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3 .O 0.3 
2.9 0.0 
2.6 
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1.7 
1.4 
1 .o 
0.7 
0.5 
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